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I. INTRODUCTION
Until the last few decades, conflicts between nation-states were confined
to four domains: land, water, air, and space.1 Common to each of these domains is the fact that they are all physical divisions with relatively distinct
borders. It was not until recently when we added the fifth domain, cyberspace,
that laws had to be adapted to deal with an entire realm of activity that only
exists intangibly.2 Cyberattacks are unique in that the individuals actually perpetrating the assaults do not need to be present within the physical arena they
are targeting, and they do not require the extensive training or heavy artillery
required for the success of most military operations.3 The Ponemon Institute
reported in 2016 that American companies lost on average $17.36 million per
year to cyberattacks, but the thieves only needed a few computers to carry out
their attacks.4
In May 2017, North Korea was linked to the WannaCry cyberattacks that
targeted personal computers in over 150 countries.5 WannaCry ransomware
held computers hostage until the ransom, which was paid in the cybercurrency
“bitcoin,” was proffered. If the ransom was not paid, all of the files on the
computer would be destroyed. 6 The use of this type of state-sponsored
cyberattack, the sole purpose of which was to extort money, was unprecedented, at least in the domain of cyberspace.7
However, state backing of robbers on the high seas has a long and storied
history stretching back for thousands of years to the Ancient Greeks. 8

1

War in the Fifth Domain, THE ECONOMIST (July 1, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/16478792.
2
Id.
3
Mathew C. Waxman, Cyber Attacks as “Force”“ Under UN Charter Article 2(4)”,
87 INT’L L. STUDIES 43, 45 (2011).
4
Eric J. Rightmier, The Effect of State-Sponsored Attacks on the Private Sector, PROQUEST LLC (April 2017), https://search.proquest.com/openview/9554a2b3a5afb733e
07914a233c7d30e/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y.
5
Charles Riley & Samuel Burke, Intelligence Agencies Link WannaCry Cyberattack to
North Korea, CNN BUS. (June 16, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/06/16/technology/wannacry-north-korea-intelligence-link/index.html.
6
What Is WannaCry Ransomware?, FOX NEWS (May 23, 2017), http://www.foxnews
.com/tech/2017/05/15/what-is-wannacry-ransomware.html.
7
Reuters, Cybersecurity Experts Fear Continued Spread of ‘Unprecedented’ Ransomware Attack, FORTUNE TECH (May 14, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/05/14/ransomware-wanna-cry-wannacry-cyber-attack-nhs/.
8
Daud Hassan & Sayed M. Hasan, Origion, Development and Evolution of Maritime
Piracy: A Historical Analysis, 49 INT’L J. L., CRIME AND JUST. 1, 2 (Jan. 12, 2017),
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1756061616300878?via%3Dihub.
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Throughout this time, nations have alternatively “treated pirates as combatants, enemies or criminals.”9 Currently, there is no uniform definition of piracy at the domestic level, and there are debates regarding the efficacy of the
international definition provided in Article 15 of the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the Law of the Sea (HSC) and Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).10 Nevertheless, it is the position of
this Note that the newer form of economic aggression displayed in the
WannaCry attack is not a new concept, and state-sponsored ransomware can
be understood in the context of maritime piracy.
The objectives of this Note are to provide a brief review of the evolution
of maritime piracy and legal approaches to it, and to analyze the new statesponsored economic cyberattacks through the lens of this longstanding international crime. State-sponsored ransomware attacks are cyberattacks which
are either funded by a government or executed by its agencies primarily for
the purpose of monetary gain. These attacks are a new concept, but the underlying action is an old one. These ransomware attacks are just state-sponsored
piracy in a new domain. As such, it is logical to conceptualize ransomware
attacks under the preexisting legal framework for maritime piracy.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
In order to conceptualize state-sponsored cyberattacks under the history
and laws surrounding maritime piracy, we must first possess a basic understanding of the subjects involved. Cyberspace is new to the technological age,
and the laws governing this new domain remain largely unrefined. Similarly,
the current domestic laws and international treaties governing piracy, which
have only been in place for about the last century, are in many ways fundamentally different from the legal philosophies on piracy that predominated
most of modern history. The effect of these contemporary changes underpins
the analysis of this Note.
A. Background on State-Sponsored Economic Cyberattacks
State-sponsored cyberattacks differ from those perpetrated purely by individuals in a number of key aspects beyond the mere fact that a country rather
than an individual is behind the assault. These differences can make statesponsored attacks both more damaging and harder to defend against.11 Unlike

9

Id. at 8.
Id. at 4.
11
Maria Korolov, 10 Deadliest Differences of State-Sponsored Attacks, CSO ONLINE
(Dec. 1, 2014), https://www.csoonline.com/article/2852855/advanced-persistent-threats/
10-deadliest-differences-of-state-sponsored-attacks.html.
10
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cybercriminals, countries will not necessarily target marketable cyber material. Instead, they will usually attempt to gain information that will benefit the
national interest in some manner. Perhaps the most immediately obvious example of the type of data a government will attempt to gain is political information stored in embassies or governmental agencies that may be important
for national security reasons. However, states may also target private companies to access trade secrets in a bid to help their domestic producers, as was
the case in the Chinese UglyGorilla attacks on five U.S. companies, including
the United States Steel Corporation, in 2014.12
State-sponsored attackers are also more likely to have large, well-organized teams, and these teams are capable of working around the clock.13 Not
only can states perpetuate attacks all day and night, but they are also capable
of maintaining penetration into foreign systems—undetected—for long periods of time.14 As of 2014 “84 percent of the reported attack discoveries were
made by third parties.”15 In contrast, private hackers do not typically have the
resources or the inclination to target more secure networks or to continue a
hack long-term.16
Article 2(4) of the United Nations (UN) Charter states “All Members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”17 This prohibition on the threat or use of force is a succinct provision, but its impact on
state responses towards disfavored actions of other nations is far-reaching.
Generally, this article restricts military attacks unless a state is acting in selfdefense or with authorization from the UN Security Council.18 In contrast, the
self-defense exception is typically not permitted for economic and diplomatic
assaults or pressure.19 In other words, a state cannot respond with physical
force when the assault itself was not physical. This proposition usually holds
true even if the targeted state suffers tremendous costs.20
With regard to cyberwarfare, Article 2(4) has been interpreted to prohibit
cyberattacks that cause physical consequences if the effects reach a certain
severity threshold, but the same is not true of cyberattacks aimed at causing
12

Id.
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
18
Ido Kilovaty, Rethinking the Prohibition on the Use of Force in the Light of Economic
Cyber Warfare: Towards a Broader Scope of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, 4 J. L. &
CYBER WARFARE 210 (2015).
19
Waxman, supra note 3.
20
Id.
13
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economic harm.21 The current use of force scholarship commonly understands
this distinction as one between “kinetic” cyberattacks (KCAs), which produce
“direct or indirect physical consequences,” 22 and non-kinetic cyberattacks,
which produce only non-physical harm.
For example, a Twitter hack in 2013 announcing an explosion in the White
House and the death of President Obama caused the Dow Jones index to plummet 145 points, costing approximately $150 billion. This incident would not
have fallen under the Article 2(4) prohibition because it was not a KCA.23 On
the other hand, in 1982, hackers tampered with software that controlled the
pump speeds and valve settings of a Soviet pipeline, leading to a massive explosion,24 which would be considered a kinetic cyberattack, and thus would
be encompassed by Article 2(4).
The 2017 WannaCry attack targeted preexisting programming weaknesses
in computers running on Microsoft operating systems across dozens of countries.25 The ransomware was capable of infecting both home computers and
the networks of larger organizations, leading to the loss of sensitive information, financial losses, disruption to regular operations, and harm to some
organizations’ reputations.26 The attack was unprecedented in scope, but despite the fact that it was a state-sponsored effort to steal from individuals and
private entities in cyberspace,27 it was not a KCA as most scholarship understands it. WannaCry was economically motivated aggression and as such
would almost certainly not be actionable under Article 2(4) as it is presently
interpreted. However, WannaCry highly resembles our historical understanding of maritime piracy and privateering in many significant ways.
B. The History of Maritime Piracy
While many pirates during the “Golden Age” of maritime piracy were true
outlaws, there existed a large system of state-sponsored piracy.28 From Queen
Elizabeth I’s Sir Francis Drake, often referred to by the Queen as “my pirate,”
to the Barbarossa Brothers, who were sponsored by the Ottoman Sultan, looting enemy ships was a common practice from the 1400s through the late
21

Kilovaty, supra note 18, at 213.
Id. at 212.
23
Id. at 211.
24
THE ECONOMIST, supra note 1.
25
Supreet Kaur Sahi, A Study of WannaCry Ransomware Attack, 4 IJERCSE 5 (2017),
https://technoarete.org/common_abstract/pdf/IJERCSE/v4/i9/Ext_89621.pdf.
26
Id. at 6.
27
Reuters, supra note 7; see also Kilovaty, supra note 18, at 212-13.
28
Jesse Greenspan, 8 Real-Life Pirates Who Roved the High Seas, A&E TELEVISION
NETWORKS (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.history.com/news/8-real-life-pirates-who-rovedthe-high-seas.
22
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1700s.29 On the other hand, laws from around the same time period often required pirates to be tried and executed aboard the capturing warship.30 The
scourge of the pirate, whether under the protection of a flag or otherwise, has
plagued sovereign nations for nearly as long as merchants have been sailing
the high seas, and while it has been eradicated in some areas for a time, it has
never been fully eliminated.31
As most Romans and Greeks understood, pirates were considered “belligerent[s].”32 This was in the context of war, and sailors looting ships were
largely considered to be acting as enemy combatants.33 The Ancient Queen
Teuta of Illyria “authorized her subjects’ ships to ‘plunder all whom they fell
in with.’ . . . This eventually led to uncontrolled piracy in the Adriatic.”34 In
time, Queen Teuta’s sanctioning of her subjects’ plundering caused a war between Illyria and Rome.35 On the other hand, not all sovereigns condoned piracy by their citizens. King Minos of Crete “is credited as the first [ruler] to
establish a strong naval fleet to [suppress] piracy.”36 A clear pattern emerged
in ancient times: Piracy flourished when governmental regimes were weak,
and it retreated in the face of strong sovereigns.37
In more recent history, we have the example of piracy on the Barbary Coast
between the 16th and 18th centuries. Piracy grew most powerful under the
protection of the Ottoman Empire.38 In response to the Barbary pirates, European nations signed treaties with the Barbary regencies requiring the Europeans to pay tribute for safe passage through the seas.39 While this was primarily
an economic venture for the Barbary sovereigns, the Europeans may have felt
more compelled to comply with the tribute demands due to the millions of
European mariners who were captured and forced into slavery by the pirates.40
This level of coercion is not present in the current-day ransomware attacks,
though the idea of paying tribute to a state for safety in a domain is similar.
Around the same time period that the piracy in the Barbary Coast was running rampant, Spain and Portugal signed the papal Treaty of Tordesillas,
29

Id.
Douglas Guilfoyle & Tiffany Willey Middleton, Law, Pirates, and Piracy, AMERICAN
BAR ASS’N (2010), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/public_education/latl-pirates.pdf.
31
Hassan & Hasan, supra note 8, at 2.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 5.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 6.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
30
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which ultimately prohibited many other seafaring European nations from stationing their ships in the Caribbean or Indian Oceans.41 As a result, France,
Denmark, and England sanctioned privateering in order to weaken the Spanish
and Portuguese who were rapidly becoming rich from trade in those regions.42
This time period later became known as the “Golden Age” of piracy.43
The common thread through these examples of state-endorsed piracy is
that all instances could be regarded as a type of economic warfare. The sponsoring state aimed the pirates at its enemies or rivals, simultaneously weakening its opponents and gaining an economic advantage, all without any formal
wars. However, this brief history has also demonstrated that tolerance for or
encouragement of piracy only leads to its growth, which makes it difficult to
eradicate in the long run.44
The Barbary pirates were not eliminated until the 1800s, after the United
States waged two wars against them and France conquered Algiers.45 Similarly, the piracy that American colonial governors endorsed, which came
about due to the costly regulations Great Britain imposed on the colonies, only
ceased when England and the colonies passed laws calling for the death penalty for pirates and their aides.46 Even still, it took well over twenty years for
the Golden Age to decline.47
C. Contemporary Understanding of Laws on Maritime Piracy
During the first half of the 20th century, the prevailing belief was that maritime piracy had largely disappeared.48 For this reason, “initial attempts in the
twentieth century to introduce a treaty regime against piracy [were] unsuccessful.”49 Instead, we now have an array of domestic laws coexisting with
international treaties regarding piracy.50 “Under international law, piracy is
[recognized] as a domestic crime of universal jurisdiction . . . .”51 With regard
to piracy, “[u]niversal jurisdiction is an older concept having little connection
41

Id. at 7.
Id.
43
Greenspan, supra note 28.
44
Hassan & Hasan, supra note 8, at 8-9.
45
Id. at 7.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Lawrence Azubuike, International Law Regime Against Piracy, 15 ANN. SURV. INT’L
& COMP. L. 43, 44 (2009).
49
Id.
50
Lucas Bento, Toward an International Law of Piracy Sui Generis: How the Dual Nature of Maritime Piracy Law Enables Piracy to Flourish, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 399, 455
(2011).
51
Hassan & Hasan, supra note 8, at 2.
42
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with ‘modern’ universal jurisdiction,” which allows any apprehending state to
prosecute certain crimes that shock the conscience of humanity, such as genocide and war crimes.52 The older conception allowed any state to take law
enforcement action on the high seas against any vessel suspected of piracy,
even vessels flagged to foreign states.53 As such, all sovereign countries could
exercise jurisdiction over piracy, but they had to do so only through their respective domestic criminal justice systems.54
Among the most contested issues under this regime is the actual definition
of the term “piracy” itself.55 In United States v. Smith56 and United States v.
Brig Malek Adhel,57 two landmark Supreme Court cases heard in the mid1800s, the United States defined piracy as “robbery, or forcible depredation,
upon the sea.”58 But U.S. statutes from the same time period added a stipulation to this definition: piracy should be defined by the “law of nations,” which
would include treaties regarding piracy.59 While the Supreme Court in the
1800s was creating a definition meant to be interpreted as adhering to the law
of nations, we have since created new treaties that alter that definition. Similar
provisions are seen in the domestic laws of England and Australia, though
other countries define piracy without reference to the law of nations.60 For
example, the domestic law of the Philippines requires “the act . . . take place
in the state’s territorial waters to constitute piracy.”61
The language “law of nations” is present in the United States Constitution,
and was invoked in relation to piracy long before any multilateral treaty involving the crime ever came into being.62 Nevertheless, the international community attempted to create a more uniform approach to maritime piracy with
the enactment of two treaties in the mid-twentieth century, of which the
United States is party only to the Geneva Convention.63 Both Article 15 of the
1958 Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea (HSC) and Article 101 of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) define piracy
as:

52

Guilfoyle & Middleton, supra note 30, at 293.
Id.
54
Id.
55
Azubuike, supra note 48, at 46.
56
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 154 (1820).
57
Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. 210, 232 (1844).
58
Hassan & Hasan, supra note 8, at 3.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 4.
62
Id. at 3.
63
Guilfoyle & Middleton, supra note 30.
53
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(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or
against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place
outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship
or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship
or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act
described in subparagraph (a) or (b).64
Key for this Note’s analysis is the fact that the action must be committed
for private ends. This distinguishes piracy from the ransomware attacks perpetrated by North Korea, due to their sovereign purpose. WannaCry was more
akin to the notion of privateering in the Golden Age of Euro-American piracy
in that WannaCry was essentially state actors working against private individuals in an “international” domain. As such, while pirates and privateers were
distinguished only by the fact that states sponsored the latter,65 the distinction
is still important when analyzing the contemporary legal framework.
III. ANALYSIS
State-sponsored cyberattacks conceptually align with the historical understanding of maritime piracy. The pirates during the Golden Age of piracy
could be viewed as the equivalent of modern-day private military contractors.66 However, military contractor activity typically tends to focus less on
material theft and more on strategic military advancement. The state-sponsored pirates that existed before the 1900s, while endorsed by monarchs, were
primarily attempting to enrich themselves and their sponsor. Similarly, the
goal of the WannaCry ransomware attack was to enrich North Korea.

64
65
66

Hassan & Hasan, supra note 8, at 4.
Id. at 2.
Guilfoyle & Middleton, supra note 30.
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A common theme between these cyberattacks and historical state-sponsored piracy is the indiscriminate nature of the taking. 67 North Korea’s
WannaCry ransomware attack did not just target other state actors. It also hit
private companies and individuals in over 150 separate countries.68 While on
a national scale India was one of the hardest hit countries, companies like
FedEx, Nissan, and railway companies in Germany and Russia, as well as at
least sixteen NHS organizations in the United Kingdom, were badly affected.69 Additionally, a large number of Chinese colleges and students were
struck in the attack.70 This single state-sponsored malware attack hit governmental entities, private companies, and individual people, and was motivated
by economic gain.
Another similarity between cyberattacks and historical maritime piracy is
the relatively low costs needed to perpetuate assault. The probability of a pirate being tried and successfully prosecuted was low, in part due to the “elusiveness and anonymity of a ship in the expanse of [the ocean].”71 The same
difficulties are presented by cybercrime. Attacks in cyberspace are hard to
track, and even if the guilty party is identified, numerous jurisdictional issues
must be addressed before a trial can occur.72
Prior to the treaties on piracy that were drafted in the 1900s, there were
several approaches to handling piracy. Alfred H. Rubin and others argue that
piratical actions by states were merely the states exercising a right to seize
passing ships in order to levy taxes against them.73 The pitfall of this “tax”
justification is that piracy was a violent seizure of merchandise from non-citizens, leaving the question of whether these countries had jurisdiction to act.74
However, playing into this understanding of the role of piracy was the idea
of negotiating tributes for safe passage, as was seen along the Barbary Coast.75
In a way, payment after a ransomware attack is like paying tribute. However,
in order to use tributes as a preventative measure, the attacking sovereign
would need to openly own its involvement in the economic assault. As would
be expected, North Korea continues to deny any involvement in the
67
J. L. Anderson, Piracy and World History: An Economic Perspective on Maritime
Predation, 6 J. WORLD HIST. 175, 176 (1995).
68
Riley & Burke, supra note 5.
69
Savita Mohurle & Manisha Patil, A Brief Study of Wannacry Threat: Ransomware
Attack 2017, 8 INT’L J. ADVANCED RES. COMPUTER SCI. 1938, 1939 (2017).
70
Id. at 178.
71
Anderson, supra note 67, at 178.
72
Deb Shinder, What Makes Cybercrime Laws so Difficult to Enforce, CBS TECHREPUBLIC (Jan. 26, 2011), https://www.techrepublic.com/blog/it-security/what-makes-cybercrime-laws-so-difficult-to-enforce/.
73
Anderson, supra note 67, at 177.
74
Id. at 178.
75
Hassan & Hasan, supra note 8, at 6.
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WannaCry cyberattack, calling accusations by the British government “‘a
wicked attempt’ to tighten international sanctions on the country.”76 And it
seems unlikely that other countries would be any more willing to openly admit
to such antagonistic behavior.
Additionally, one of the primary historical problems with paying tributes
and accepting a semi-regime of piracy is that maritime predation tends to escape the control of the sponsoring nation. For example, the promotion of piracy by the ancient Illyrian Queen Teuta, who “[authorized] her subjects’
ships to ‘plunder all whom they fell in with,’” eventually led to “uncontrolled
piracy” in the Adriatic.77 These concerns are precisely the reason why the U.S.
government has a general policy against negotiating with kidnappers.78 Logically, conceding to pay incentivizes the enemy to continue extorting ransoms
from the United States. Therefore, sacrificing a few people in the short term
may better serve the state in the long run.
Historically, states are more successful in driving out piracy when they
take a strong stance against the activity, state-sponsored or private. King Minos of Crete is credited as the first ruler to establish a strong naval fleet with
the goal of stopping maritime piracy, and he was successful at suppressing
it.79 In 1698, England passed the Piracy Act, which imposed the death penalty
for the crime of piracy.80 “Between 1716 and 1726, a large number of pirates
were executed in public under the new legislation,” and approximately 100
years later, the United States fought in the Barbary Wars to end piracy in the
Barbary Coast.81 At some periods in history, justice against pirates was so
swift and decisive that those found to be pirates could be tried and executed
aboard the capturing warship.82
When the pirates were tried and executed aboard the capturing warship,
the punishing nation was exercising jurisdiction in the high seas. Analogous
to this situation in the high seas is the internet, which could be conceptualized
as international waters. If countries could track attackers back to their home
IP addresses, they could immediately launch a counterattack. Because the
counterattack would not necessarily ever exit cyberspace, whether the retaliating country would have the jurisdiction to mete out a punishment against
their attacker on the spot is debatable.
76
North Korea Calls UK WannaCry Accusations ‘Wicked’, BBC NEWS (Oct. 31, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41816958.
77
Hassan & Hasan, supra note 8, at 5.
78
Adam Taylor, The Logic of Not Paying Ransoms, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/08/21/the-logic-of-not-paying-ransoms/?utm_term=.4a9021105f47.
79
Hassan & Hasan, supra note 8, at 5.
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Id. at 7.
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If nations approached state-sponsored ransomware attacks in such a direct
fashion, determining which level of force the UN Charter Article 2(4) Use of
Force provision would allow in such cases would be difficult. When retaliating against another country, state actions move beyond the punishment of
criminals and into more strategic waters: “[T]here is no clear consensus on
how [a retaliating country] could legally respond, whether with armed force,
its own cyber attack, or some other measure.”83 But, the history of maritime
piracy seems to suggest countries should strike back with a cyberattack that
cripples the original assaulter’s ability to continue its cyber-predation or risk
the expansion of economic cyberpiracy.
Looking at the issue through a more modern piracy lens, analyzing responses to ransomware attacks under the current definition of maritime piracy,
as found in HSC Article 15 and UNCLOS Article 101, is difficult because the
act must be committed for private ends to constitute piracy.84 Ransomware
attacks like WannaCry do meet the definitional deprivation requirement, but
state-sponsored ransomware attacks are by their nature not meant for private
ends, as they are acts perpetuated by the government for a public purpose.
However, subpart (c) of the definition of piracy includes “any act of inciting
or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).”85
Therefore, if a state were to direct and pay a private entity to carry out a ransomware attack, the attack could potentially still fall within this definition.
If that premise is accepted, then the retaliating state would have the authority under UNCLOS to seize the property or information stored on the attacker’s computer, which is analogous to the pirate’s ship. 86 This seizure
would take place remotely, so the chances of actually apprehending the hacker
behind the attack would be slim. However, it would authorize a retaliating
country to have a defense that is both legally viable and an adequate threat, as
countries like North Korea may be less likely to attempt ransomware hacks if
they know it could be legal for another country to steal their information in
return.
If that premise is not accepted, the analysis would turn on the UN’s Article
2(4) provision on the use of force, which as discussed in the Introduction, has
several significant flaws when it comes to purely economic cyberattacks. Primarily, this article restricts military attacks unless a nation is acting in self-

83
Scott Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in International Law, 25 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 191 (2009).
84
See Hassan & Hasan, supra note 8, at 4.
85
Id.
86
See Legal Framework for the Repression of Piracy Under UNCLOS, U.N. DIV. FOR
OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.un.org/depts/los/piracy/piracy_legal_framework.htm.
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defense or with authorization from the UN Security Council.87 The self-defense exception is typically not permitted for economic and diplomatic assaults or pressure.88 As such, a state generally cannot respond with physical
force when the assault itself was not physical, even if the targeted state suffers
tremendous costs.89
IV. CONCLUSION
The newer form of economic aggression displayed in the WannaCry attack
is not a new concept, and state-sponsored ransomware can be understood in
the context of maritime piracy. Prior to the 1900s, nations frequently allowed
maritime piracy to flourish and often even sponsored the predatory practice.
The history of these regimes demonstrates that society as a whole is better off
if states take a hard stance against maritime piracy. In many ways, ransomware attacks are to the internet what pirates traditionally were to the seas, so
countries would be best served by striking back against these types of economic cyberattacks unequivocally.
However, modern treaties regarding maritime piracy restrict the definition
of piracy to private actions for the benefit of private parties.90 Therefore, modeling the approach to cyber threats (and any potential treaties within that
realm) off of the current piracy treaties should be done with a critical eye towards the potential shortcomings of these treaties as applied in the cyber
realm. For example, the provision requiring that the illegal acts be committed
for private ends does not translate as well to the cyber realm as it does to the
physical seas. If state troops board an American vessel, even if the state’s purpose in authorizing the boarding is purely mercenary, the boarding is still an
act of physical aggression that easily falls within the provisions of other relevant treaties, such as UN Article 2(4). But if the allegorical equivalent occurs
in cyberspace, there is no physical violence to accompany the state-sponsored
thievery, forcing states to work around the language in current treaties in order
to find a legal retaliation.
The world as a whole has an abundance of experience dealing with maritime piracy. The understanding that thousands of years of marine pillaging
has given us, both in the form of our more traditional understandings and in
the form of our modern-day approach, should guide us as we begin tackling
the domain of cyberspace, and more specifically, state-sponsored cyberattacks
against private parties.
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